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Abstract
Background: Growing attention is being paid to the importance of trust, and its corollaries such as mistrust and
distrust, in health service and the central place they have in assessments of quality of care. Although initially
focussing on doctor-patient relationships, more recent literature has broadened its remit to include trust held in
more abstract entities, such as organisations and institutions. There has consequently been growing interest to
develop rigorous and universal measures of trust.
Methods: Drawing on illustrative ethnographic material from observational research in a UK diabetes clinic, this paper
supports an approach that foregrounds social practice and resists conceiving trust as solely a psychological state that
can be divorced from its context. Beyond exploring the less-than-conscious nature of trust, the interpretations attend
to the extent to which trust practices are distributed across a range of actors.
Results: Data from clinical encounters reveal the extent to which matters of trust can emerge from the relationships
between people, and sometimes people and things, as a result of a wide range of pragmatic concerns, and hence can
usefully be conceived of as an extended property of a situation rather than a person. Trust is rarely explicitly articulated,
but remains a subtle feature of experience that is frequently ineffable.
Conclusions: A practice approach highlights some of the problems with adopting a general psychological or
intellectualist conception of trust. In particular, assuming it is a sufficiently stable internal state that can be stored or
measured not only transforms a diffuse and often ephemeral quality into a durable thing, but ultimately presents it as a
generic state that has meaning independent of the specific relationships and context that achieve it. Emphasising the
context-specific nature of trust practices does not dismiss the potential of matters of trust, when they emerge, to be
transposed to other contexts. But it does highlight how, on each occasion, trust as a relational quality is ways ‘done’ or
‘achieved’ anew.
Keywords: Trust, Diabetes, Practice theory, Quality
Introduction
Trust has become a ubiquitous word in relation to many
contemporary concerns–from finance to health, from
politics to the internet. Within the health context, it has
increasingly been associated with discussions about the
quality of care, since it potentially captures something of
the non-technical, inherently interpersonal nature of
healthcare delivery¹ [1, 2]. In the UK, recent shocking,
high-profile examples of neglect in hospital wards and
care homes have been drawn on by many to illustrate some
of the unintended consequences of setting institutional
targets and adopting financial incentives designed to in-
crease the efficiency of the health service. Central to this
claim is the argument that since people who seek help are,
by definition, vulnerable, they have no choice but to rely
on others for their care. As a result, both media reporting
and official investigations have employed a bundle of
terms, including compassion, empathy, care and trust, to
contrast with organisational values associated with finan-
cial and bureaucratic rationalism (see for example, [3]).
Trust has thereby come to represent one of the crucial
dimensions of health service delivery said to potentially
escape the domination of bureaucratic, administrative and
market values [2].Correspondence: Simon.cohn@lshtm.ac.uk
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In line with this, and in apparent contrast to the re-
silience of survey results that report doctors remain the
most trusted profession [4], a number of authors have
argued that instances of trust in health care settings are
declining in reaction to the changing nature of the
health service, paralleling an erosion of trust in society
more generally [5, 6]. At the centre of such propositions
is the view that the intrinsically social nature of care is
being subsumed by commercial and managerial forces,
undermining the interpersonal foundations of clinical
encounters and care itself [7]. In response, some have
consequently advocated the introduction of ‘intelligent’
trustworthiness–that is, the careful and considered in-
vestment of appropriate trust – as a guiding principle to
counter the impersonal systems of audit, accountability
and the market [8]. The argument has proved to be
powerful and persuasive, and often is reproduced uncri-
tically [9]. Thus, whilst there may currently be limited
evidence that levels of trust have a causal effect on cli-
nical outcomes, there is nevertheless a growing assump-
tion that it constitutes a crucial feature of care, and
therefore should be protected and nurtured in order to
improve people’s experience of medical services and
their overall health [10].
Some limits of trust research
The majority of classic writing assumes trust primarily
relates to the dyad between a trustee and a trustor–in
the health context, between the doctor and patient–
although in recent years, this scope has broadened to in-
clude more generalised kinds of trust; for example, in
entities such as social structures, institutions and organi-
sations [11, 12]. Much of this work has concentrated on
what trust means in an abstract sense, whether in terms
of its definition, its distinctions with related terms, or by
developing a set of analytical principles (see for example
[13, 14]). In this literature it is commonly said to be
something we can ‘have’, that can be incrementally
increased and built up, or decreased and even lost
altogether [15]. It is also said that possessing trust serves
as a means to navigate the relationship between expert-
ise and authority, and is frequently conceptualised not
only as the basis for co-operation between people, but as
a resource to be drawn on [16]. It’s not surprising, then,
that many of these arguments draw on an underlying
economic model in which trust is a precious form of
capital that can be gained, invested, accumulated, given,
undermined, earned, received, and so on. Some writers
go further, and not only present it as an object of ex-
change and investment, but also the result of careful cal-
culation, appraisal and management [17]. By reifying and
generalising trust in this way, the associated terminology
serves to support the idea it is a potentially measurable
psychological entity [18], even though there is currently
little agreement as to what dimensions to include, and
hence no standard metric has been established [19].
However, as the psychologists Harvey et al. acknow-
ledge [20], there is inevitably a difference between what
people say about trust and what people actually do in
practice (what they term ‘stated’ versus ‘enacted’ trust).
A number of sociological studies investigating what is
actually enacted in health contexts have consequently
served to problematize the overtly mentalist approach of
much trust research. Starting with the observation that
it can be as much an affective state as a rational one,
and that emotions can both guide and influence how
trust evaluations are made [21], this work has, in
combination, emphasised the complex negotiations that
underlie interactions, and hence the plethora of situa-
tional factors likely to be significant. More specifically,
ethnographic approaches not only reveal the subtle,
pragmatic ways in which trust can surface [22] but also
modes by which it is can be embodied (see for example
[23]). Such work illustrates how conscious deliberations
and evaluations of trust are often accompanied by
other, less than conscious, processes. This general phe-
nomenological approach highlights how objects and
other non-human actors can shape the assumptions and
interpretations actors make and that trust is actually a
very fluid and varied entity (see for example [24, 25]). By
doing so, this empirical work has led scholars to empha-
sise the contingent, contextual nature of trust [26], and
that frequently there are other relevant actors beyond
the classic dyad [27].
The renewed interest in care more generally, and in par-
ticular a relational approach that emphasises care as inter-
action rather than something that is simply bestowed on
one person by another [28], also serves to illustrate the in-
herent ambiguity and ambivalence of health-related rela-
tionships. Brodwin [29] points out that because of this,
care and coercion in health settings cannot easily be dis-
tinguished from each other, since the relationship between
health carer and patient is invariably unequal and non-
reciprocal. Thus, whilst trust might initially be associated
with establishing symmetry or mutuality in a relationship,
accounts also illustrate the ways in which sometimes trust
can actually be produced by such imbalances. For ex-
ample, some have noted how, in the health context espe-
cially, trust can sometimes be the only thing that an
individual is left with when they have limited choice but
remain dependent on others (see for example [30]). In
such situations, both patients and professionals may try to
preserve a sense of trust even when doing so is unjustified
[31] and, further, that when they do so such attempts may
become manipulative and surreptitious attempts to con-
trol the situation or the other party [32].
Nevertheless, whilst these primary accounts clearly
demonstrate some of the ways in which deliberative
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evaluations of trust are accompanied by a wide range of
other, non-conscious activities and effects, an implicit
danger is that by continuing to adopt ‘trust’ as an ab-
stract noun has the potential to reinforce the idea it can
be separated from its context and that it consists of some
universal properties independent of the situation within
which it arises. Part of the problem is that this notion of
trust commonly provides the basis on which it can be
said to endure over time and in different contexts. Yet,
as soon as it is rendered into such a generalised concept,
discussion of trust necessarily has to become over-
simplified and devoid of the specific details, histories
and subjective standpoints that constitute its emergence
in any particular instance. In other words, there remains
a tension in the literature between, on the one hand, a
strong emphasis on the situatedness of trust, and on the
other, the use of a generic term that implies it is in some
way an intrinsic, a priori, entity.
So how might one conduct an empirical study of trust
in a health setting that resists presenting it as a bankable
resource located inside the head or body, and instead
presents it as a feature that is continually contingent on
the features of specific contexts? By arguing that trust is
not a psychological state or the result of deliberative
evaluation, but rather something which only emerges
from specific practices in particular situations shifts its
conceptualisation from being an entity in and of itself, to
being a quality potentially attributed by people to particu-
lar assemblages of people and things. Such a practice-
based approach draws from diverse sources, including
Pierce’s pragmatism [33], Tarde’s interactionist sociology
[34] and Bourdieu’s notion of habitus [35], to provide an
account of human behaviour not through trying to ascer-
tain its antecedents, but rather from examining the ways
in which meaning is a consequence of human action [36].
Although variations of practice theory have circulated in
the social sciences for a number of decades, there has
been a growing interest in them over recent years. In part,
this can be attributed to a rejection of the dominance of
individually-focused models which attempt to describe
behaviour as the linear consequence of a set of internal
processes. This can all too easily support an ideology of
responsibilisation, by which the imperative on individuals
to manage and take control rapidly becomes an expectation
that only they are responsible for their health status [37].
Practice theory, in contrast, adopts a somewhat counter-
intuitive approach, arguing that it is people’s actions in the
world as they connect and co-opt other people and things
which create meaning [38]. Rather than reproduce the
mentalists’ distinction between what is conscious and
what is automatic, a general commitment to embodied
disposition and the interaction of ‘background’ [39] is
used to highlight that, although we may not be aware of
such processes, they are often comprise of very rich and
creative processes. Initially this emphasis on how things
are achieved or constructed ‘in the present’ may appear to
negate the fact that trust has an enduring nature. After all,
from the more usual perspective, trust is conceived of in
terms of the influence it can have on how people access
health care services or respond to them in the future; as
such, it precedes in some form or other a particular event,
such as choosing to take medication or follow a
doctor’s advice. But a commitment to interrogating
what gets done and said in specific social situations
implies that what might be said to ‘travel’ from one
context to another is not ‘trust’ per se, but rather the
range of sociocultural and material resources that
have the potential to influence its emergence in a
new setting through further practices.
Diabetes and trusting relationships
Drawing on observations in a UK diabetes clinic, the re-
mainder of this paper will use excerpts to illustrate ways
in which trust arises during everyday exchanges and ac-
tivities between doctors and patients. Instead of basing
interpretations primarily on people’s reflections, atten-
tion is placed on the very specific circumstances of prac-
tice, including whatever material elements might play an
integral role, since all these exert very real influence
on shaping how an event is ultimately constructed or
‘achieved’. In order to illustrate the themes introduced–
that matters of trust are emergent, always contingent on
multiple factors, and remain inherently ambivalent–I
draw on instances when matters of trust appear to be
foregrounded even if this is not articulated by actors
themselves.
The idea of ‘self-management’ has become an increas-
ingly common feature in the care of chronic conditions
such as diabetes. It could be said to be derived from two
distinct forces: the shift from paternalistic to patient-
centred care, and acknowledgement that on-going treat-
ment strategies now require continual attentiveness and
adjustment. Accompanying terms such as empowerment
and concordance, and the proliferation of so-called
shared-decision making tools, the drive to encourage pa-
tients to monitor, record and alter their medication, diet
and exercise is broadly conceptualised in terms of mim-
icking the homeostatic feedback that the body lacks in
order to achieve biochemical stability. Accompanied by
the rise of electronic devices to measure glucose levels,
and insulin pens and pumps to adjust different kinds of
insulin to provide either a basal or immediate response,
patients are being increasingly encouraged to reflect and
act autonomously on their metabolism ‘in real time’.
Some commentators have been sceptical that an em-
phasis on promoting autonomy is in any way emancipa-
ting, and have commented that there is an increasing
expectation that the idea of the patient as an ‘active’
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subject who takes on primary responsibility for their
care is merely an extension of disciplinary surveillance
[40]. However, from another perspective it is not simply
that the person with diabetes now has more things to
do, but rather the patterning of who is responsible for
doing those things, and when they are expected to be
done, is shifting. In order to be able to manage their
diabetes daily they must still use and rely upon a wide
range of things and other people, just as they had done
previously; but new configurations based on self-
management refashion the nature of those relationships.
In order to try and achieve some kind of blood glucose
stability given this new distribution, many different asso-
ciations not only need to be established and maintained,
but need to be trusted.
My starting point, therefore, is adopt the idea of prac-
tices in order to concentrate on the details that relate to
how matters of trust emerge and are enacted in a dia-
betes clinic. Using ethnographic vignettes to illustrate
some of the breadth of trust practices, the following re-
sults serve to exemplify some of the apparently incon-
gruous situations and the multiplicity of actors which
fall within their broad scope. These examples are se-
lected precisely because they may well be missed using
methods that assume trust is a stable entity, such as a
questionnaire prompt or formal interview. Ultimately,
this paper presents trust as the degree to which the
sense of stability and predictability emerges from a set
of relationships between people, physical objects and
the material environment, and hence how a quality at-
tributed to such practices may determine, or restrict,
opportunities for repetition in the future.
Results and discussion
The findings below are derived from analysis that fo-
cused on identifying occasions when matters of trust
come to the fore but are not necessarily made explicit.
Although selective, the data are drawn upon to propose
that trust, and associated terms such as mistrust, can be
conceived of as qualities of the relationship between ac-
tors rather than things in themselves [41]. Whilst this
necessarily implies trust is inherently subjective and situ-
ated, it opposes locating it either solely ‘in the head’ or
as a feature of the external world. Rather, the data pre-
sents accounts of how people work to make sense of,
and experience, their own position within a set of rela-
tionships, and how in this process particular actions can
emerge as ones that convey trust as a quality of those
connections.
Connecting bodies and people
Some people diagnosed with diabetes don’t seem to ever
find a way to accept this new status, and establish a self-
identity that accommodates, rather than resists, the
condition. It is as though they are adrift, uncontained, and
resolutely contest the idea of having to address the condi-
tion on their own. This was the case for Mary. She has
Type I diabetes, but her mother has Type II. They invari-
ably come to the clinic together, although of course are
not seen together by a doctor. Nevertheless, the dynamic
of mother and daughter is very strong, and shapes the
consultations they both have. The relationship between
them is undoubtedly complex; the father left the family al-
most a decade ago. The daughter has had poor blood glu-
cose control for many years now–probably since she was
diagnosed as a child. Although not yet diagnosed with a
psychiatric condition, it is likely that she will soon also be
referred for psychological help. Meanwhile, her eyesight is
deteriorating due to retinopathy, and she has started to
have ketoacidosis attacks and be admitted on and off as an
emergency inpatient. The consultant wants the daughter
to take control, to ‘own’ the condition, and to stop what
the doctor called her ‘reckless behaviour’. Regular self-
monitoring and insulin adjustments would hopefully lead
to greater coherence and integration into her everyday life;
he is concerned that she might find herself caught in a
never-ending cycle of very poor control and hospital ad-
mission. So he asks her:
Dr: What do you think the best thing to do might be?
Mary: Get my mother to leave me alone
Dr: But surely she is trying to help you… make sure
you are ok, and control your diabetes?
Mary: I just think she should worry about her own
diabetes, not mine. I’m ok. I know what I’m doing.
Dr: Do you? I mean, your HbA1c results are not
good, Mary.
Mary: No, well. That’s not the whole story, is it?
There are more things to worry about than a one-off
blood test.
Mary’s words not only suggest she is caught in loops
of uncertainly and distrust in relation to the health service
and health care professionals, but that she is also ques-
tioning whether or not she can trust her mother. On the
one hand, she responds to the consultant’s first question
by rebuffing the influence of her mother’s apparent stifling
concern. Yet almost immediately afterwards, Mary rejects
the idea that her diabetes management can be assessed by
a single blood measurement (the HbA1c result), since to
do so would disregard the ‘whole story’ of her distress and
that the illness is constituted by multiple relationships. As
the exchange continues, it is clear that for Mary the
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notion of being ‘out of balance’, as she put it, is a diverse
and wide-ranging state rather than one that can be attri-
buted solely to her glucose levels, and that what she really
seeks is a much broader feeling of things being settled, in
which she, and her own body, are positioned. From her
perspective the condition arises not merely from her
internal physiology, but from an entangled network of
diverse elements which all affect her sense of constancy
and balance–and it is potentially all of these that can play
a role in her sense of stability.
This then, invites one to rethink the notion of self-
management of diabetes–that in practice this means
management of a wide variety of relationships. In the
context of diabetes, practices of trust consequently relate
to the need to establish a feeling of stability, rather than
empirical evidence of it, across many different kinds of re-
lationships in order to counter feelings of vulnerability or
uncertainty. In this way, trust describes a relational quality
that emerges from interaction. And while it is always
made, or unmade, in the present, its effect is to appear not
only as something that will endure to potentially shape
future interactions, but just as significantly can be
extended backwards, to refashion how past experiences
are recalled and brought into association with the present.
The effects of not saying
In real-life clinical settings, it is often the apparently su-
perfluous or ritualised elements of social interaction that
are most relevant, since they function to establish a level
of sociality that is independent of the specific medical
content that may be imparted. As well as what may be
said, it can also be what is not said that engenders a
sense of trust. For example in the following exchange
between a consultant and John, a 49 year old patient
with Type II diabetes, the utterances from both parties
could be said to be quite scripted:
Dr: So, tell me how things have been going. How has
the diabetes been?
John: Fine, ok I suppose.
Dr: Good… I mean, anything been bothering you…
Any problems?
John: …No.
Dr: No. Well. Good. I mean, are you sure?
John: Yes.
Dr: Oh, OK then. Good.
[PAUSE]
But amidst this ostensibly mundane excerpt a lot is
implicitly going on. The doctor is trying to gently en-
courage John not only to feel at ease, but to be frank
and honest with him, whilst the patient is reluctant to
make himself more defenceless than he already feels. As
a result, the doctor, having asked a second time, decides
not to press any further. Following this short exchange
there is a brief pause, which serves to confirm the sig-
nificance of something which was not said. The short
period of silence establishes a shared secret between the
two, since neither decides to instigate anything further.
Instead, the conversation turns to the more technical
matter of insulin dosage. But by each allowing the pause
in conversation, a kind of acknowledgment of the other
person’s position is intimated, and a sense of mutual
trust based on difference, rather similarity, is established.
If prompted to talk explicitly about trust, respondents
like John seldom offered an immediate summative
response, but instead recounted one or two particular
incidents or interactions from which they then made
some sort of evaluation, to themselves as well as myself
as the researcher. So when asked in what ways they trusted
(or did not trust) the doctor that they had just talked to,
patients would often focus on particular things that were
said, or actions that were taken, as indicative of a more
general and distributed feeling of trust. In the following
excerpt, for example, a female patient who had just met a
new consultant for the first time, draws on some material
objects that she felt were instrumental in being able to es-
tablish, retrospectively, the nature of the relationship she
had with the doctor:
Thinking about it now, I didn’t trust him at the
beginning. I looked over on the desk, and instead of
my notes, which usually consist of a really thick pile
of papers from all the years I have been going, there
was just a small brown A4 folder… with maybe just a
couple of sheets of paper inside… I think that being
so surprised by that folder really affected how I spoke
to him [the doctor], and perhaps even what I said
about my diabetes.
The lack of extensive notes is contrasted with the
usual bundle of paperwork–and in so doing calls atten-
tion to the regular expectations and network of ways of
doing things, and an interruption to a sense of fami-
liarity and continuity. Clearly, for this patient, an estab-
lished opinion on whether she felt her relationship with
the doctor was a trusting one or not did not really exist
beforehand. Only following a prompt during the inter-
view did she actively reflect upon things; while recoun-
ting the apparently minimal paperwork the presence of
the thin folder itself intervened in her assessment of the
nature of her relationship with doctor. The more general
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point is therefore that trust is commonly an aspect of
social life that is not articulated, whether to others or
even people themselves. In order to talk about trust at
all, assessments are made of particular events that, at the
time, may not have felt noteworthy. Describing what was
done or not done, as well as what was thought or said, is
in parallel a process of specifying the quality of the con-
nections that comprise the specific practices.
Actions of deception
Perhaps surprisingly, one of the range of actions that
falls within trust practices but would be excluded from a
study that adopted a more objectivist approach is that of
deception. Dishonesty is quite a common feature of en-
counters at the clinic. From the medical professionals'
perspective, because the underlying imperative is to try
and ensure the patients’ relationships with the clinic and
staff members are durable, they will often tolerate such
acts because there are ‘there are bigger things to worry
about’. Meanwhile, since patients often feel that it is not
their diabetes that is being assessed but they themselves are
being morally judged, they adopt various defence strategies.
For example, the task of self-monitoring is often one
that many patients do not do as regularly as they are ad-
vised to. Nevertheless, they often feel it is important to
try and please their doctors and nurses, and as a result,
sometimes fill in the blood glucose diaries just before an
appointment. In fact, some become quite sophisticated
at this–even (so they told me) allowing tiny drops of
blood mark the paper to further suggest the authenticity
of the record. On one occasion, I asked Sue, a patient
with Type II diabetes who now uses insulin after being
on oral medication for many years, directly about this:
Me: But surely, isn’t the diary in the end just to help
you, to help you see whether your medication is
keeping your glucose levels stable and low?
Sue: I suppose. Yes. But I have my own ways to do
that. The diary thing, well, they asked me to do it, so I
don’t want to disappoint them…
Anyway, I naturally didn’t say anything to anyone
about what she had said, and her trick of using a blue
pen and a black pen alternately to fill out the diary. On
a separate occasion, however, a nurse specialist at the
same clinic spontaneously told me that she, and every-
one else working in a diabetes clinic, often did not
believe a patient really had completed the dairy legiti-
mately. She told me ‘they weren’t so easily duped’ and
that ‘you cannot trust those’–perhaps deliberately lea-
ving the statement ambiguous as to whether she was re-
ferring to the diaries of the patients. The nurse went on
to tell me that invariably there would be specific clues–
the form of the writing, the measurements themselves,
and so on. So I asked her why she never challenged pa-
tients when suspected this. She replied:
That would just be too damaging. We carefully build
up relationships with patients. We don’t preach at
them, we go at their pace, we build up trust… And
anyway, the diary is meant to be for them. We use
HBA1c to assess glucose levels–it’s far more accurate.
And objective.
The diary not only serves as a means to produce and
maintain the fiction that self-monitoring is being con-
ducted regularly, but is drawn upon by both the patient
and the health professional to maintain a sense of com-
monality, even if both sides know it to be fake: for either
of them to reveal this ‘secret’ would be too destructive.
In this way, a broader sense of trust emerges from the
specific configuration of deception and mistrust.
Accounts such as this not only illustrate how the scope
of trust practices must include a range of related terms,
because they all in different ways infer what form of trust
emerges from the interactions between people and things,
but also that apparently contradictory practices can, from
different perspectives, engender (or undermine) the emer-
gence of trust. Thus, beyond acknowledging that trust
cannot be conceptualised as an object or resource because
it is inherently a relational quality that always emerges
from very particular configurations, on any occasion new
elements might be foregrounded, while others recede. As
a result, conceptualising the quality of trust as being con-
stant or fixed not only ignores the possibility that at any
time it can radically alter, but that this experience of pre-
cariousness is itself one that engenders trust as a stabi-
lising feature.
Threats of betrayal
Jane had thought that she was, in her words, ‘a good dia-
betic patient’. By that, she meant that she monitored
herself regularly, and had a sufficient understanding of
the biomedical model to allow her to dial up and alter
different doses of the fasting acting and slow acting
types of insulin she was on. However, after an HbA1c
test, which give average blood glucose levels over the
previous three months or so, it transpired that her con-
trol was not nearly as good as she had thought. At first
she doubted the HbA1c figure, but her doctor emphati-
cally told her it was reliable and now the standard way
they measured glucose control. So if Jane wanted to
trust her doctor, she also had to trust this test result.
Jane paused for a short while, and then suggested that
perhaps it was her electronic glucose meter that hadn’t
been working properly, and that although she had done
everything ‘correctly’, it may have consistently given false
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readings. Her doctor was clearly not convinced; he con-
ceded it was ‘possible’, but he said this in such a way that
it was clear he really didn’t accept it as a reasonable ex-
planation. Jane sensed this, and that the doctor was
starting to get a little frustrated. So she tried one more
time to protect her status as being someone who was
good at self-management not only to the doctor, but
herself also, and began to ask if one or both of the insu-
lin types could somehow be contaminated, or of an in-
ferior strength. But her voice trailed off as the doctor
started to shift in his chair, now a little agitated that Jane
was not accepting, from his perspective, the reality of
the situation. Finally, Jane said the following, while she
gently rested her hand on her midriff:
Ok. Well, I still don’t understand it. I did everything
that I was meant to. I managed really well, as you
know. But perhaps it’s something to do with my
pancreas or something. Maybe my body is, you know,
misbehaving or something. Maybe it’s my pancreas…
In the course of the exchange and Jane’s concluding
speculation, the fact that the puzzling test result was in-
escapably nestled in a number of other trusting relation-
ships that she did not want to have undermined, forced
Jane to work through an account in which she could pre-
serve what was most important. As different possibilities
are brought to the fore they are experienced as potentially
competing with others; attributing trust to one relation-
ship required the severing of trusting relationships in
others. The exchange itself was a delicate choreography,
as new possible actors were introduced by the patient only
to be cautiously dismissed by the doctor. Finally, blaming
her own body may well have been a somewhat linguistic
flourish–but it nevertheless served as a way to protect the
trust Jane valued elsewhere. For her, living with diabetes is
far from being simply about her pancreas, and that ulti-
mately losing trust in her body became a strategy to pre-
serve a sense of trust in other things that she experienced
as even more fundamental to her condition.
This last ethnographic example illustrates the fact that
trust practices can enlist a wide range of entities–people,
institutions, material objects and even one’s own body–
and that one cannot assume which entities are necessar-
ily more significant in a particular configuration than
others. Trust is not contained simply in the person, but
arises from the specific distribution of all these things.
Further, the potential combination of such diverse ele-
ments is experienced by people such as Jane as a fluid
landscape that can be creatively drawn on to make
meaning, rather than existing as a stratified hierarchy
which dictates some kind of logic. As a result, any sense
of trust is always ephemeral, since it is contingent on the
particular elements brought to the fore.
Conclusions
In this paper I have suggested that we resist conceiving
trust as an object or a resource. Although in much of
the literature trust is frequently presented as a counter
position to the influence of financial pressures in the
health service, conceiving it as a form of capital that can
be drawn on, invested and traded, far from representing
an alternative to rational bureaucracy can reproduce and
reinforce the same market principles and forces. An al-
ternative approach, based on the increasing interest in
more ethnographic accounts of trust, presents it as an
inherently emergent quality of interacting features that arises
during specific practices. To acknowledge its complex and
often multivalent nature, and the very indeterminacy
and instability which fosters it, means that trust is always
contingent on a particular context and specific associa-
tions. Arguing that trust is a subjective quality of a set of
relationships reiterates the point made by others that it
is not simply associated with a patient trusting the health
professional, or vice versa, but should be broadened to
include all manner of relationships, including trusting
oneself, one’s body, the health service, and other signifi-
cant people. All these forms coalesce around a person at
times when they feel vulnerable and try to make sense of
their situation by locating themselves in a network of
relationships that might sense of stability.
Beyond highlighting how trust can be both a conscious
evaluation yet is also unconsciously affected by a wide
range of factors, I have suggested that to do so neverthe-
less can maintain a mentalist or egocentric conception.
A practice orientation is a way to conceptualise the more
distributed nature of situated actions from which indi-
viduals may gain a sense of trust. In this way, I have
tried to argue that the exceptional status of the person
as the repository of trust should be challenged by at-
tending to the material elements, such as a glucose mon-
itoring diary, or even a diseased part of the body, that
can be just as active in its emergence. The consequence
of this approach means that the identification of agency,
which tends to be implied in discussions about trust
being gained or lost, for example, must also be distri-
buted across the heterogeneous assemblage. Taking a
cue from Montelius and Giritlis-Nygrens’ work on
‘doing risk’ [42], it is therefore not simply a matter of a
person ‘doing’ trust work or ‘accomplishing’ it, but ra-
ther that a person may come to identify certain con-
figurations in which they find themselves as ones that
engender a sense of trust. Uncertainty over the extent to
which they are the ones who ‘do’ the trusting is precisely
one of its features–a person cannot simply ‘decide’ to
trust or not. A related point is not just that trust can be
thought about as a quality that emerges from a situated
context, but that it cannot be rigorously demarcated from
other associated qualities–such as mistrust and distrust. Not
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only does this reflect how attributing the quality of trust is
invariably nebulous and multimodal but, as the examples
have illustrated, what may be identified as trust frequently
occurs alongside mistrust and distrust, rather than at the ex-
clusion of them [43, 44].
In the specific context of diabetes care, rather than
thinking about diabetes as a singular disease entity, the
observations within a clinic suggest that one can instead
think about diabetes practice as a collection of many
successive occasions on which people (patients, doctors,
nurses, relatives, friends, etc.) and objects (monitors, syrin-
ges, pumps, etc.) are brought together to regulate a blood
glucose level (because to not have diabetes means that
these different actors are not brought together). A patient’s
ongoing engagement with diabetes, whilst described as self-
management, in reality necessitates frequent arrangements
with many different objects and people–and includes many
more than those normally foregrounded at the clinic.
Highlighting these relationships above individual decision-
making extends the notion of management of metabolism
and homeostasis, which are generally conceived of as
internal and physiological, to include all the relationships of
actions, reactions and feedback mechanisms that potentially
constitute living with diabetes. It is through this more
expansive approach that a revised concept of trust is
pertinent–as a quality that may be attributed to varied
relationships that are temporarily established that might
suggest, or promise, a level of constancy and security.
The examples of diabetes management clearly illustrate
this. The problem for both patients and professions is that
rather than being in control of many of these elements,
there is always an inherent sense of uncertainty. The
clinical expectation is that patients should ‘own’ their
condition and work to achieve physiological control over
time by monitoring their blood glucose, adjusting their
medication, and being vigilant about their diet and exercise.
Yet from the patients’ point of view, it makes little sense to
try and achieve this kind of biological stability independent
from all the other kinds of relationships that they experi-
ence as pertinent. The homeostatic quest is consequently
not simply about levels of sugar or insulin, but the multiple
connections and feedback relationships that constitute the
flow of everyday life. As a result, far more diverse practices
are drawn on as ones relevant to their condition, and
therefore might be considered stable or not. However, trust
as a quality of those relationships is never established
uniformly across this diverse range of factors, or at every
scale. As people draw on certain elements in order to estab-
lish a sense of trust, this frequently comes at the cost of
destabilizing other relationships.
Given the increasing importance of discussions about
trust in health service delivery and the quality of care, my
purpose has not simply been to deconstruct its usual con-
ception, or purely emphasise its dynamic and complex
nature. Rather, it has been to point out that by attending to
the specific details of ethnographic description, trust as a
stable, quantifiable and generalised resource rapidly
dissolves–not through intellectual analysis, but because in
everyday life it simply does not exist as such an entity. This
suggests that chasing a singular, generalisable concept or
measure not only provides a restricted representation, but
that in doing so we may actually exclude the specific fea-
tures that characterises its role and potential in health
settings. This is because the very process of making it
known in this way separates it from those more dynamic,
context-specific, and contingent features which make rela-
tionships with people, things and our bodies active and
meaningful. In contrast, I have suggested one can talk about
trust as a quality that on occasions is attributed by people to
particular assemblages of persons and things, and that in the
case of diabetes management this quality equates to a gen-
eral sense of stability. But within this, a new issue arises; as a
person evaluates specific practices they also come to reflect
upon their own place within them, and the nature of the ties
they have with other people and things. In this way, trust is
neither an object nor a subjective feeling, but rather a qual-
ity experienced by persons as they reflect upon their own
place in multiple networks of relations.
Methods
This research is based on extensive ethnographic observa-
tions of a diabetes clinic in a large NHS hospital in England,
UK conducted as part of a larger multidisciplinary study
during 2012–13. The data is drawn from the study "East
Cambs & Fenland Diabetes Integrated Care Evaluation",
which gained NHS Health Research Authority ethical ap-
proval (reference: 11/EE/0148 ). Consent was obtained from
all participants and health care professionals. All names are
pseudonyms. Consultations and interviews were audio-
recorded and transcribed and imported into NVivo 10 along
with fieldnote texts. After a general inductive analysis using
techniques from grounded theory to identify and develop
themes [45], examples were chosen that best illustrated the
general topics identified.
One of the features of ethnographic research is that it does
not claim to be directly reproducible, because data is under-
stood to be co-created by those being researched and the
researcher themselves [46]. In addition, attending to the spe-
cific material aspects of a social situation as potentially
equally significant further means that individual vignettes
must be recognised as unique occurrences, and cannot be
readily generalisable. However, in response to claims that the
data is thereby purely anecdotal, this kind of research gains
its relevance and from the abductive theoretical claims and
arguments developed, rather than empirical details presented.
In other words, although the paper emphasises that specific
utterances and scenarios are unique, and although analysis
is acknowledged to be interpretative and hence open to
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claims of subjective bias, the issues underlying them are
consequently proposed as being applicable to other in-
stances, involving other people in other settings.
These methodological issues therefore directly corres-
pond to the argument presented in the paper; engaging
with any idea of ‘quality’ in health must, ultimately, be
concerned with thinking through how best to capture
the contingent aspects of care that resist or escape con-
tainment, since to not try to do so would be to ignore
their more radical and subversive potential to interfere
with the more established categories that tend to repre-
sent what we take to be ‘social reality’.
Endnote
1This paper is based on a talk presented at The Many
Meanings of 'Quality' in Healthcare, Cumberland Lodge,
UK, 4 June 2013.
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